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Chapter 3 Financing Singapore’s SMEs and the Crowdfunding Industry in 
Singapore (Prepared for the Book: The Singapore Economy: Designing Its 
Dynamism and Inclusion, Edited by Hoon Hian Teck) 
 
Tan Swee Liang, Tok Yoke Wang, Thitipat Chansriniyom1 
 
Abstract  
 
As new digital technologies emerge that make the provision of financial services 
more efficient, they hold the potential to address barriers that SMEs face in 
accessing credit. This paper found empirical evidence that crowdfunding improved 
SMEs’ timeliness to pay debt. Anecdotal evidence from SMEs suggests that getting 
crowdfunding loans also induced financing from banks. In just four years, 
Singapore’s crowdfunding volumes have grown rapidly to make it the top 
crowdfunding hub in Southeast Asia. The rapid development of Singapore’s 
crowdfunding industry can be attributed to its higher GDP per capita, higher level of 
financial sector development and greater availability of venture capital. Our results 
suggest that policies do matter to the development of the crowdfunding industry. 
The paper concludes with a discussion on the implications of crowdfunding on the 
future of banks and Singapore’s approach to regulating crowdfunders.  
 
 
Introduction  
In many countries, SMEs represent an important share of firms and employment.  
SMEs play an important role in a healthy and dynamic economy. Recent research 
has shown SMEs faced greater financing barriers than large firms2, and in turn, 
financial constraint affects the average firm size (Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (1999).  
In the Asia Pacific region, 39% of firms are fully and partially credit constraint3, 
compared to the world average of 37% (Figure 1).   
                                                     
1  Tan Swee Liang, Singapore Management University, Tok Yoke Wang, Thitipat Chansriniyom, IMF-Singapore 
Regional Training Institute. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position 
of the International Monetary Fund. The authors thank Christine Ho and Yang Zhenlin for helpful guidance. They also 
thank the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance for providing the data, industry professionals for providing 
information about institutional details and industry trends. All remaining errors are our own. They also wish to thank 
Stephan Danninger and Natan Epstein for helpful comments.  
 
2     Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 2005; Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt 2006; and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven 
Maksimovic 2006 
3  Here are definitions of credit constrained firms according to the World Banks’ Enterprise Survey:  
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Figure 1: Percentage of Credit Constraint Firms 
 
 
Many factors account for the credit constraint including information asymmetries, 
collateral shortage and lack of credit information.   Lending to SMEs fell further 
during and after the global financial crisis as banks become more cautious in 
lending. The share of lending to SMEs declined both in advanced economies and 
in emerging markets (Figure 2).  Lending to SMEs in Emerging Markets fell from a 
peak of 30% in 2007 to 21% in 2009. It has resumed in recent years, but the volume 
has remained below pre-crisis-levels in some jurisdictions (e.g. Singapore, HK, 
Korea, Italy).  According to the Financial Stability Board 4 , empirical evidence 
suggests that the more stringent risk-based capital requirement under Basel III has 
slowed the pace of lending to SMEs relative to other sectors. However, this effect 
was found to be temporary and differs across jurisdictions.  
                                                     
(i) Fully credit constrained (FCC) firms have no external loans because loan applications were rejected or the firm 
did not even bother to apply even though they needed additional capital.  
(ii) Partially Credit Constraint firms (PCC) used external sources of finance for working capital and/or investments 
and/or have a loan outstanding but did not apply for a new loan 
(iii) Marginally Credit Constrained firms (MCC) are those that used external sources of finance for working capital 
and/or investments during the previous fiscal year and/or have a loan outstanding at the time of the survey; and  
(iv) Non-credit constrained firms (NCC) firms are those that did not apply for financing because they have enough 
capital.  
 
4  Financial Stability Board, “Evaluation of the effects of financial regulatory reforms on small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) financing”, June 2019 
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Figure 2: SME Loans (% of Total Bank Loans) in  
Emerging and Advanced Economies 
 
 
In Singapore, SMEs make up 99% of the companies in Singapore, employing about 
65% of its workforce and contributing to nearly half of the country’s nominal GDP in 
2018.  Yet, the share of total bank credit to SMEs is disproportionately low at 13.3% 
in 2017, while that to large corporates is about three times higher at 47.0%, with the 
remaining 39.6% to consumer loans5 (Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Share of Loans by Type - Singapore 
                                                     
5  In 2017, the outstanding SME loans was S$87.54 billion while total banking credit to both businesses and consumers 
was S$651.93 billion; making SME share to total banking credit at 13.4%. Source: Monetary Authority of Singapore 
MAS website.  
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In Singapore, where access to finance is not a problem, the small and micro 
enterprises who lacks collateral and credit information would still find it difficult to 
get a bank loan.   A SME Development Survey in 2017 by DP Info found 35% of 
SMEs indicated financing concerns (surpassing the 22% figure in 2016 and 14% in 
2015 respectively. According to MAS’ internal survey6, micro and small enterprises 
accounts for 57% of banks’ outstanding SME loan portfolio. SMEs who have lower 
credit ratings faced greater difficulties getting a loan and higher spreads because of 
their higher risks and their loan is mostly unsecured.  
.  
Figure 4: Singapore SMEs with Finance-Related Issues 
                                                     
6  MAS Financial Stability Review, November 2018, Box F.  
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Source: Experian 
 
Section 3.1 explains how crowdfunding works and describes crowdfunding 
development in Singapore using our survey and interviews of crowdfunders. Section 
3.2 examines the key drivers of crowdfunding for nine major fintech players in the 
world, with a focus on Singapore’s fintech sector using panel data modelling. 
Section 3.3 examines whether crowdfunding financing has improved cashflow for 
SMEs using time series regression. Sections 3.4 describes the risks of 
crowdfunding; Sections 3.5 and 3.6 analyse the implications of fintech on the future 
of banks and Singapore’s regulatory approach to crowdfunders.  
 
3.1 Crowdfunding Development in Singapore 
 
Technology has transformed financial services in every area from payment, 
savings, borrowing and managing risks (Figure 5).   One of the transformations 
comes from the use of the mobile phone for payments, lending and borrowing.  This 
has allowed “unbanked” consumers in low income countries to access financial 
services for the first time, raising financial inclusion.  In this paper, we focus only on 
one aspect of the fintech transformation, on P2P lending or crowdfunding7 and as 
                                                     
7     Different terminologies have been used to refer to crowdfunding and to avoid confusion, it is important to note that 
crowdfunding, P2P lending and marketplace lending are commonly used terms. They refer to all types of 
crowdfunding (including equity-based) and includes both consumer and business lending.  The Bank of 
International Settlement (BIS) uses the term Fintech Credit to refer to all types of crowdfunding.  The Cambridge 
Centre for Alternative Finance classifies crowdfunding models into 11 categories: P2P consumer lending, P2P 
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mentioned earlier, show how it can improve access to finance for the underbanked 
SMEs. 
 
Figure 5: Technology Transformations to Financial Services 
(to replot) 
 
 
Crowdfunding is about raising small amounts of money (funding) from a large 
number of people (crowd, not necessarily family or friends), typically via the 
Internet or social media.  The matching of lenders to borrowers is conducted 
directly on the crowdfunders’ platforms. What makes crowdfunding attractive for the 
SMEs compared to bank loans is that the loans are usually not collateralised, of a 
smaller quantum and of a shorter loan duration, with faster approval time.  Globally, 
the total crowdfunding market is mainly dominated by consumer lending (US and 
UK) but in Asia and Singapore, corporate lending tends to dominate.  However 
recently, some crowdfunders (e.g. Minterest) have been issued a licence to lend to 
consumers (see Section 3.5). In Box 1, we describe the various types of 
crowdfunders in Singapore. In Appendix 1, we provide two case studies of 
Singapore-based crowdfunders. 
                                                     
business lending, equity-based crowdfunding, reward-based crowdfunding, invoice trading, real estate 
crowdfunding, debt-based securities, mini-bonds, balance sheet business lending and profit sharing crowdfunding.  
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Studies have shown that crowdfunders can enhance the efficiency of intermediation 
through the use of digital technologies and granular customer data. Crowdfunders 
can provide faster and better credit risk assessments, shorten the time to approve 
a loan (e.g. through auto matching), as well as lower transaction costs, by using big 
data analytics and fraud detection. For example, Fuster et al. (2018) found that 
crowdfunders in the U.S. are able to process mortgages about 20 percent faster 
than traditional lenders, without the expense of higher defaults. Berg et al. (2019) 
found that credit assessment using digital footprint of customers’ registration 
behaviour on websites predicted default rates better than that based on credit 
bureau data alone. Jagitani and Lemieux (2018) found that the U.S. crowdfunding 
platform Lending Club used non-traditional data for grading loan ratings, and the 
grades predicted the performance of the loans over the two years after origination. 
These studies suggest that crowdfunders are better able to price their loans 
according to the risk of their customers and less risky customers would be charged 
lower interest rates.   
Our survey of crowdfunders in Singapore yielded a similar story.  The average 
processing time for a loan ranges between two hours to five days, compared to 
banks of between 45 to 60 days.  Many of them (e.g. Validus) were able to charge 
lower interest rates to consumers with higher credit ratings as suggested by their 
in-house credit assessment algorithm. Based on our data collected, there is a 
wide variation in their non-performing loans NPLs. See Appendix 3 for a list of 
crowdfunders in Singapore.  
Box 1: Crowdfunding Models  
 
Crowdfunding8 the matching of lenders to borrowers via an online platform. The 
first crowdfunding started in1997 to raise funds for a British rock bank, Marillion 
to fund the band’s reunion tour.  Since then, crowdfunding has grown rapidly and 
different forms of crowdfunding have emerged. We briefly describe five different 
types of crowdfunding models below.        
  
Donation-based Crowdfunding 
Used for fundraising for charitable causes and do not provide any yield or returns.  
                                                     
8     The term “crowdfunding” was coined by Michael Sullivan, an entrepreneur who was trying to fund a video-blog 
project in 2006.   
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Examples: U.S: Kiva (2005) and GoFundMe (2010) 
                  Singapore: Giving Asia, Giving.sg and Simply Giving 
Who bears the risk: Investors 
Rewards-based Crowdfunding 
Platform matchers investors with companies/people who are launching 
projects/new product (such as a 3D printer) in return for certain perks on pledged 
amounts.  
Examples: U.S: Kickstarter (2009) and Indiegogo (2008) 
                 Singapore: Moolah Sense and Minterest 
Who bears the risk: Investors 
Lending-based Crowdfunding9 
Platform matches investors with corporates in return for an interest on the loan 
(pure lending-based) or where the investor purchases a debenture or bond, to 
be paid specified interest rate during the term of the loan (debt-based) or where 
the investor purchases equity issued by the company, to be paid a dividend on 
the shares out of the company’s profit (equity-based).  Many of the platforms 
offer invoice-financing where it is structured as a security with the invoices as 
collateral.  
 
Who bears the risk:  Under this model, the crowdfunder matches the lender and 
the borrower, but it does not bear the risks of the borrower as it is not involved in 
the loan contract between the borrower and the lender.  Funds and the loan 
repayments are segregated from the platform’s own account, and the 
crowdfunder earns its revenue from fees levied on the transacting parties e.g. for 
loan origination and servicing ongoing loan repayments. 
 
Examples   
     In US: Lending Club, Beehive 
     In Singapore: 
         Lending-based crowdfunding: Funding Society and Validus 
        Debt-based crowdfunding: Fundnel and Funded Here 
                                                     
9    In Singapore, the predominant form of lending is to corporates rather than individuals. Lending to corporates are 
deemed to be an offer of debentures and falls under the Securities Futures Act and these crowdfunders are required 
to hold a capital market services license.   
Lending-Based Crowdfunder
(loans/debt/equity)
Borrowers
Crowdfunding
Platform
Lenders
Provision of funds
Repayment
Lender 
bears 
the risk
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        Equity-based crowdfunding: CapBridge which recently tied-up with the  
                                                    Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) to launch  
                                                    Singapore’s first private equity stock exchange  
                                                    InvestaCrowd (real estate crowdfunder) 
 
Excluding the outliers, the crowdfunders’ NPL is lower than banks’ (1.3% 10  vs 
4.6%11 in 2018). Notwithstanding these encouraging data, the fintech industry has 
not yet experienced a full credit cycle where default risks rise during downturn.  
 
The Singapore market is small but growing rapidly. The Singapore market, 
which started a decade later than US and UK, is small compared to the global 
market when measured by total funds raised, number of platforms, or share of 
outstanding bank loans. Nevertheless, it has grown rapidly to become the 
eighth largest in terms of volume of crowdfunding  raised (at US$191 million, 
Figure 3); and eighth in terms of crowdfunding  per capita (US$29 per capita) 
in 2016.  China has by far the largest crowdfunding market in the world, at US$358 
billion.  Globally there are more than 2,000 crowdfunding platforms (China has 
approximately 1,021 licensed operators as of 2018; followed at a distance by the 
U.S. which has 191 as of 2018; and the U.K. 63 as of 201812).  
 
In Singapore, there were 19 crowdfunding platforms as of 2018. Our survey of 
crowdfunders shows that 100% of them expect their business and the industry to 
grow rapidly in the next 24 months13. Loans amounting to US$191 million was raised 
via crowdfunding, amounting to 0.29% of banks’ lending to SMEs. In other 
countries, crowdfunding shares to bank credit are also small. For example, in the 
U.K., crowdfunding was estimated to be 1.4% of the outstanding stock of bank 
lending to consumers and small businesses at end-201614. In China, the figure was 
3% at end-2015 (Creehand & Borst, 2017). Despite its small size, crowdfunding has 
                                                     
10    Data is based on the average NPLs of four crowdfunders in 2018 (Funding Socieities, Validus, Capital Match and 
Minterest). Crowdfunders such as Moolahsense and Fundtier have higher NPLs. 
 
11    Data is retrieved from MAS Financial Stability Review (2018) 
 
12    Data for China is from P2P Market Data, for U.S. from Fundly and for U.K. from Financial Conduct Authority   
Consultation Paper 18/20.      
13    We surveyed nine crowdfunders and received five fully completed responses.  
14    Committee on the Global Financial System and the Financial Stability Board (2017). 
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drawn the attention of bankers and regulators because of its capacity to enhance 
and disrupt financial services. (BCBS, 2017).   
 
Figure 6 - Crowdfunding Volume (US$ million) 
  
 
3.2 Key Drivers of Crowdfunding  
 
What accounts for the variation in crowdfunding volumes around the world? 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2018) found the level of economic and financial 
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development, economic growth, as well as the quality of legal and other institutions 
to be significant drivers of overall credit.  Extending this to crowdfunding in per capita 
terms, Claessens et al. (2018) found a positive, non-linear relationship with GDP 
per capita and a negative relationship with the degree of competition of the banking 
system and banking regulation stringency. Rau (2017) found that barriers to entry 
and prevailing financial depth (i.e credit to GDP) both help promote the volume of 
crowdfunding, as do the rule of law, control of corruption, and quality of regulation 
in general. 
 
In this paper, we modified Claessens et al. (2018)’s approach15, using a strongly 
balanced panel data of nine countries – Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, UK, US and Singapore over the period 2013 to 2016.  Ideally, China 
should be included given its importance.  However, we had to drop it from the 
sample because that China is the biggest market in both volume and per capita 
terms and it driven by a unique set of factors.  As such its inclusion might affect the 
fit of the regression.  
 
We estimated various models with different variables that could explain 
crowdfunding volume in different jurisdictions (such as the level of economic 
development in the country, its financial sector development, availability of venture 
capital, the ease of doing business, its country risk, and strength of legal rights). For 
purpose of discussion, consider this regression:  
 
ln_CFit = α + β1 ln_GDPit +  β2 ln_GDPit2 + β3 ln_VAit  + β4 ln_DBit + β5 ln_ICRGit 
                 + β6 ln_FAit + β7 ln_FDit + d1C1i + d2C2i + dn-1Cn-1,i + εit                   
 
where the dependant variable CFit is crowdfunding per capita for country i, at time 
t, in US$. The explanatory variables are: GDPit, -- GDP per capita as a proxy for 
economic development; GDPit2  to capture possible nonlinearity in the relationship; 
VA -- venture capital availability to measure the ease of raising venture capital (its 
                                                     
15    Claessens et al. (2018) conducted multivariate cross-country regression analysis for a sample of 63 economies for 
2016 ci = ai + b1yi +  b2yi
2 + b3LIi + b4RSi  (i=1,... 63) where yi  is the log of GDP per capita in economy i, as a measure 
of economic development, and the variable yi
2 captures possible nonlinearity in the relationship; LIi is the Lerner index 
of banking sector markups (an indicator of market power) in economy i; and RS is the regulatory stringency index (as 
constructed by Navaretti et all (2017)).  
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values lie between 1 to 7, from extremely difficult to extremely easy);  FA and FD 
financial institution access and depth that capture the level of financial sector 
development across the two dimensions; DB -- World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business Score (not the ranking) to capture how conducive it is to do business (the 
higher the number the better16); and ICRGit – International Country Risk Guide with 
three subcategories and their respective weights, political (50%), financial (25%), 
and economic (25%) (the scores range from 0 to 100 such that higher values 
signifying less risk). We investigate if countries with better institutions (e.g. 
regulations that enhance business activities, as opposed to those that constrain 
them) grow faster and as a result enable SMEs to grow and drive demand for 
crowdfunding. Lastly, the country dummies Ci capture country-specific 
characteristics that are fixed or invariant over time (these could be geographical 
location, market size, entrepreneurship level, society’s acceptance to risk-taking, or 
characteristics that do not vary over a long period of time). Singapore’s country 
dummy was dropped to avoid multicollinearity and used as a country base-
reference for comparison with other countries17. See Appendix 2 for a Glossary of 
the variables used.   
 
By construction, higher values of DB index signify better ease in the doing business, 
and higher values of ICRG signify less risk and as expected, the coefficients for DB 
and ICRG have positive signs but they are not statistically significant in explaining 
crowdfunding volume (see Appendix 4). Hence, we dropped these two variables 
from the regression, Table 1 shows the final regression results. 
 
 
Table 1: Regression results for Crowdfunding per capita  
using Fixed Effect Model 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16    We use the Ease of Doing Business score (the higher the better), instead of the Ranking indicator (the lower the 
better). 
17    Data for crowdfunding volume are from Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance CCAF. Data for population, GDP, 
regulatory quality, and venture capital availability are from the World Bank. Data for financial access and financial 
depth are from the IMF. 
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VARIABLES 
(1) 
Main Model 
  
GDP per Capita 31.03*** 
 (11.91) 
Square of GDP per Capita -1.722*** 
 (0.546) 
Availability of Venture Capital 9.975*** 
 (1.194) 
Financial Institutions Access -6.236* 
 (3.266) 
Financial Institutions Depth 18.65*** 
 (5.022) 
AUS 6.982** 
 (2.793) 
IND 12.55 
 (7.756) 
IDN 26.48*** 
 (7.853) 
JPN 5.500 
 (3.351) 
KOR 4.934 
 (3.425) 
MYS -10.19** 
 (4.799) 
GBR 3.834 
 (3.087) 
USA 8.411*** 
 (2.715) 
Constant -149.8** 
 (72.59) 
Observations 45 
R-squared 0.933 
Number of Countries 9 
Robust Yes 
RMSE 0.978 
Dependent Variable Crowdfunding per Capita 
 
We found positive and significant relationships between crowdfunding per capita, 
and GDP per capita, venture capital availability and financial development depth. 
The negative estimated coefficient on squared GDP per capita suggests that such 
effects become less important at higher levels of development. The negative 
estimated coefficient on financial development access suggests that the lower the 
level of financial access, the easier for crowdfunding activities to thrive because 
they can fill the funding gap from households and firms.  
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The results are intuitive for Singapore – its higher level of GDP per capita, 
more developed financial market, greater availability of venture capital18,  are 
key factors behind the growth of crowdfunding financing in Singapore. For 
Singapore, which already has a high level of financial development and access, 
further lowering the cost of financial services (through fintech) might not increase 
the demand for financial services and this is where the government can play a role 
to encourage technology adoption and fintech development.  Indeed, the Singapore 
government’s push towards digitalisation and growing the fintech market have 
played a significant role though this was difficult to capture in the regression. The 
dummy variables for Indonesia and US are significant and positive (at the 1% level) 
and similarly for Japan (at the 10% level), suggesting that there are country-specific 
factors that contributed to the higher crowdfunding per capita relative to Singapore, 
after controlling for the other explanatory variables. The country specific factors for 
Indonesia could be attributed to its relatively younger population, with high mobile 
phone penetration, high demand and adoption of fintech services. For the US, 
Silicon Valley is the global technology hub with a huge global talent pool and ready 
availability of venture capital which drives growth of fintech activities19.  Our small 
sample size did not allow us to include these variables in the specification. 
 
Figure 7 shows a decomposition of the goodness-of-fit (R2) for Regression (2). GDP 
per capita variables accounted for 23% of total R2, venture capital availability 
contributed 6%, financial institutions access and financial institution depth 
contributed 20%, while the remaining 39% is due to country dummies.  
Governments can make a difference to the ensuring depth in financial 
institutions, and ease in venture capital availability.  
 
Figure 7: Decomposition of Goodness of Fit20 
                                                     
18    According to a recent Accenture study using data from CB Insights, it found that Singapore is the third largest 
fintech market by funds raised, just behind China and India.   
19   Global Fintech Hub Report (2018). 
 
20    Owen decomposition of R2, See, Frank Huettner and Marco Sunda, “Axiomatic Arguments for decomposing 
goodness of fit to Shapley and Owen values”, Electronic Journal of Statistics, Vol 6 (2012). 
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3.3 Impact of Crowdfunding on SMEs’ Cashflow  
 
As discussed earlier, SMEs, particularly smaller ones faced financing constraints as 
they lacked collateral and solid financials. In the last five years, the rapid rise in new 
digital technologies in the financial services sector (financial technology, or fintech 
for short) has helped SMEs overcome some barriers to financial access (OECD, 
2018).  
 
While banks in Singapore have been supportive of lending to SMEs, their share of 
loans to SMEs have remained steady at 13%. In addition, there are various 
government financing schemes to help SMEs such as such as the Micro Loan 
Program (MLP) and the SME Working Capital Loan but the take-up rate has been 
low.   With the advent of crowdfunding, SMEs have now an alternative source of 
finance to tap into.  
 
From our survey and interviews with crowdfunders, their business models are well-
suited to solving SMEs’ liquidity problems by providing low quantum, short-term 
loans at competitive rates efficiently.   Even as SME loans growth moderated from 
12% in 2014 to 4% in 2017, crowdfunding increased by 300% in one year (Figure 
4). The surge in crowdfunding is due to the entry of more crowdfunding firms into 
the industry since 2016.  This partly reflected MAS’s move to ease the entry 
requirements for securities-based crowdfunding (SCF) in 2016, followed by efforts 
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to improve the conduct of crowdfunding business and disclosure in August 2018 
(see Section 3.5 below).  There is an inverse relationship between crowdfunding 
and the days turned cash variable – a measure of the timeliness of debt payment 
by SMEs. 
 
Figure 8 – SME Bank Loans, Days Turned Cash and Crowdfunding (yoy)
 
 
We analyse whether crowdfunding has affected SME cashflow. We expect an 
increase in the volume of crowdfunding to lead to quicker settlement of debt, hence 
easing SME cashflow. We use Days Turned Cash (DTC)21, as a measure of how 
quickly the SMEs pay off their debts -- the percentage of debts paid on or before 
due date.  We used the average across all industries.  A lower number means that 
SME settle their debts more quickly (or their debts turned cash) on average across 
all industries. 
 
                                                     
21    The DTC data (from Experian, previously DP information Group) is collected based on payment records of more than 
120,000 companies in Singapore, across eight major sectors in the economy (retail, wholesale, construction, 
hospitality / food and beverage, information and communications, manufacturing, services, and transport / storage), 
in each quarter. It is also computed as national average. 
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DTC is sometimes referred to as Days Payable Outstanding.  It is tricky to interpret 
the DTC number.  A high DTC (compared to industry average) does not necessary 
mean that the company is a bad credit, because it could be using the excess cash 
for other purpose such as investing.  On the other hand, a low DTC may indicate 
that the company is not fully utilising its cash position and may indicate a company 
operating inefficiently. There is no clear threshold of what is a good or bad.  It varies 
significantly by industry, competitive positioning and bargaining power 
 
The model is: 
    
ΔDTCt = α + β1 * AFEt (yoy) + β2*CFt (yoy) + β3 GDP (yoy) +ut  
  
where the dependent variable ΔDTC is the year-one-year change in days turned 
cash. The explanatory variables are AFE access to financing expectations, as year-
on-year growth rates; CF or crowdfunding as year-on-year growth rates, 
interpolated from annual data and GDP growth. The data is from 2013 to 201722.  
 
Table 2 below summarises our regression results. The coefficient on CF is negative 
and significant i.e. crowdfunding improves the timeliness of debt payment by SMEs 
(reduction in DTC). Likewise, improved expectations of access to financing 
improves the timeliness of debt payment (reduction in DTC).  GDP growth, which is 
the control variable that captures the overall macroeconomic environment for SMEs, 
is weakly positive (at the 10% level).  This is because stronger economic growth 
could induce SMEs to more efficiently use their excess cash for investments (in 
expectation of higher returns) and stretch out their payment to suppliers.  Thus, a 
higher DTC in this case is not an indication of cashflow problems.  
 
Table 2: Regression Results for Days Turned Cash Model using OLS 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS 
   
AFE Y-o-Y Growth -0.324** -0.320* 
                                                     
22    Crowdfunding volume data is from Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, and financing expectations data is from 
CEIC. 
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 (0.140) (0.154) 
CF  Y-o-Y Growth -0.0674*** -0.0660*** 
 (0.00522) (0.00525) 
GDP Y-o-Y Growth  1.179* 
  (0.603) 
Constant 2.902** -0.551 
 (1.073) (2.194) 
   
Observations 15 15 
R-squared 0.812 0.863 
Robust Yes Yes 
RMSE 3.206 2.855 
Dependent Variable Y-o-Y Change in Days Turned Cash 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The above suggests that crowdfunding has a positive effect on SMEs’ 
timeliness to pay their debt.  This is consistent with the finding from our survey of 
crowdfunders that SMEs (such as small restaurant owners) have benefited from 
crowdfunding as they not only improved their cashflow but also induced financing 
from banks. This shows that crowdfunding plays a catalytic role to spur bank 
lending to SMEs.  While we do not have the figures for Singapore, survey data 
from the UK23 showed that 79% of borrowers had attempted to get a bank loan 
before turning to crowdfunding. 33% of them thought it was unlikely or very unlikely 
that they would have been able to secure funding elsewhere had they not been 
successful in getting a crowdfunding loan.  
 
3.4  Does crowdfunding pose any financial stability risks in Singapore? 
Given the still small size of crowdfunding volumes relative to bank credit, it does not 
yet pose any systemic risks in Singapore. Nevertheless, the modalities and risks of 
the crowdfunding market can change rapidly and regulators should be vigilant of 
any changes in size and interconnectedness. At a macro-level, increased 
competition from new entrants could weaken lending standards, leading to higher 
default rates and financial instability. Collaborations between banks and 
crowdfunders and their interconnectedness could lead to contagion risk. A rising 
                                                     
23  Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, The UK Alternative Finance Industry Report, 2014. 
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share of crowdfunding credit could increase procyclicality; that is, a weakening of 
lending criteria during an economic upswing, and a tightening of credit during an 
economic downswing can amplify economic shocks. At the micro-level, the risks 
from crowdfunding are mainly in the investor protection area. This could arise from 
fraud, improper handling of investor funds, inadequate or misleading disclosure and 
cyber risk (high operational risk). Improving disclosures by crowdfunding platforms 
and ensuring quality data can bridge the information asymmetry for investors. 
Section 3.5 explains Singapore’s regulatory response to crowdfunding.    
 
3.5 Implications of Fintech on Banks - Possible Scenarios  
 
The rapid growth of crowdfunding and other fintech services have raised concerns 
that banks would be disrupted.  While it is too early to predict the eventual outcome, 
Hatami (2015) and the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2018) postulated 
various scenarios about how the future would look like. The following is adapted 
from Hatami’s four scenarios ranging from minimum to complete disintermediation 
(Figure 9). We categorise the four scenarios into a “good” or “bad” outcome from 
the perspective of the incumbent bank.   
 
Figure 9: Overview of Scenarios for Bank Business Models 
 
 
Good Outcome. Under the “Better Bank” scenario, the incumbent banks are 
swiftly digitizing and modernizing themselves (e.g. using biometry, video, chatbots, 
robo-advisor services) to retain its core banking services and customer 
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relationships. In the “Distributed Bank” scenario, financial services become 
increasingly fragmented and incumbent banks carve out enough of a niche to 
survive and exist alongside fintech firms.  Each of them focused on providing 
specific products extremely well, offering services from payments, loans, savings 
products, forex, investments and mortgages.  A new type of online business could 
also emerge to aggregate these providers to enable consumers to access multiple 
providers with one login and interface.    
 
Bad Outcome.  At the other extreme, under the “New Bank” scenario, the 
incumbent bank cannot survive the technology disruption and is replaced by a 
challenger bank. The “New Bank” provides a full suite of banking services on “built-
for-digital” banking platforms, in a cost effective and innovative way. These new 
players obtain banking licences from regulators and own the customer relationship. 
For example, Atom and Monzo, are digital banks in the UK that aim at simplifying 
the banking experience using app technology and avoiding paperwork and physical 
branches. Users can open an account for free with both of them within minutes. 
 
In the “Disintermediated Bank” scenario, fintech companies use front-end 
customer platforms to offer a variety of financial services from a diverse group of 
providers. The incumbent bank is relegated to simply providing commoditised 
services (such as deposit taking).  Customers perform banking services with mobile 
phone companies or social network providers (e.g. Apple Pay, Samsung Pay, 
Google Wallet and Facebook for payment). For loans, customers bypass the banks 
and approach their preferred P2P lenders instead.  
 
These scenarios are extremes and in practice, a combination of them could play 
out.  The rapid pace at which technologies and innovation are happening meant 
that new products and channels could be created quickly. Regulatory changes 
(such as the issuance of digital bank licences in Singapore (see below) could also 
allow the entry of new players and create more disruption.  
 
What are the possible scenarios for Singapore?    
New regulations would play a key role in shaping the future outcome for the 
banking sector. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) announced in June 
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2019 that five digital banking licences will be issued for digital players. This would 
increase the competition for banks as players in the technology and e-commerce 
sector, including crowdfunders are likely to apply for these licences.  
 
Under the existing internet banking framework, the incumbent banks could already 
set up digital banks as they operate within the same prudential framework as 
traditional banking. DBS is building digital banks in overseas market to reduce 
operating costs – it set up Digibank in India in 2017 -- the country’s first mobile-only 
bank that is branchless and fully-digital. The model is replicated in Indonesia. DBS 
has also embarked on the journey to transform from within to become fully digital.  
Other banks in Singapore have also responded to the competition through seeking 
partnerships with fintech players and adopting new technologies e.g. UOB invested 
and partnered with Israel fintech AI firm Personetics to use data analytics to provide 
customers with real-time and personalised guidance on their financial decisions.  
UOB has also invested S$10 million in crowdfunding platform, OurCrowd in 2016. 
OCBC bank is providing investment advice through its robo-advisor.  
 
It is too early to tell how the landscape will be like with the entry of the new digital 
banks but from the experience of Hong Kong who has issued eight digital bank 
licences, it is likely that many of the new digital banks would be consortiums instead 
of startups like those in Europe and US.   Thus, we foresee more fintech 
partnerships in the near future24.  Respondents to our crowdfunding survey have 
likewise indicated a preference for partnerships with traditional banks, insurance 
and brokerage companies.  For example, Visa in Singapore has partnered with 
Validus to offer a virtual credit card payment facility to the SMEs for faster payment. 
All in, this raises the possibility of a “Better Bank” outcome existing 
alongside a “Distributed Bank” outcome.   
 
3.6   Singapore Regulator’s Response to Crowdfunding 
                                                     
24    A PWC (2017) survey showed 82% of financial services companies globally plan to increase FinTech partnerships in the 
next 3-5 years. CEOs at financial services firms around the world are allocating 15.4% of their annual turnover to develop 
FinTech projects (e.g. investing in FinTech companies, launching IT projects, or dedicating additional resources to existing 
FinTech projects). 
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There is currently no internationally agreed standard on regulatory approaches to 
crowdfunding. FSB and CGFS (2017) have reviewed the crowdfunding market 
globally and concluded that due to its small size, crowdfunding does not pose 
systemic risk to the global financial system. The risks posed by crowdfunding is 
mainly related to investors. Hence, most regulators have adopted a proportionate 
approach to regulating crowdfunding. This means regulating in a risk-focused 
manner, according to the activity of the crowdfunders (whether equity-based or 
lending-based crowdfunding), so as to strike a balance between the benefits and 
risks of crowdfunding. Given the rapid pace of innovation and change in the 
crowdfunding sector, regulators are monitoring this sector closely so as to keep 
pace with the changing nature and risks.   
 
Likewise in Singapore, MAS seeks to balance improving access to capital for 
businesses and mitigating the financial stability risks arising from crowdfunding. It 
also adopts a proportionate approach to regulating crowdfunding, by applying risk-
appropriate regulations to the specific activities that are conducted, be it lending to 
corporations or individuals.  
  
First, lending to corporations via crowdfunders is subject to the prospectus 
requirements under the Securities and Futures Act because an invitation to lend 
money to a corporation in Singapore is considered as an offer of debentures under 
the law. Equity-based crowdfunding will similarly attract prospectus requirements. 
The prospectus requirements aim to ensure timely and accurate disclosure of 
information so that investors can make informed decisions about their investments. 
However, there are exemptions from prospectus requirements for small offerings, 
private placements, and offers to institutional and accredited investors 25 . 
                                                     
25    Definition of small offers: under section 272A of the SFA, offerors may make personal offers of securities, up to $5 
million within any 12-month period, without a prospectus subject to certain conditions. Further details on the criteria 
for a “personal” offer can be found in the Guidelines on Personal Offers made pursuant to the Exemption for Small 
Offers.  
Definition of private placements. Under section 272B of the SFA, offers of securities to no more than 50 persons 
within a 12-month period may be exempted from the Prospectus Requirement subject to certain condition.  
Definition of Accredited Investors:  wealthy individuals with net personal assets exceeding SG$2 million in value (or 
the equivalent in a foreign currency) or with an income in the past 12 months of not less than SG$300,000 (or the 
equivalent in a foreign currency). Corporations with net assets exceeding SG$10 million in value (or the equivalent in 
a foreign currency) are also accredited investors.  
Definition of Institutional Investor: under Section 4A of the SFA.  The definition includes inter alia: a holder of a capital 
market license, an approved exchange, a designated clearing house, a pension fund, or collective investment 
scheme, a person (other than an individual) who carries on the business of dealing in bonds with accredited investors 
or expert investors. 
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Crowdfunders that facilitate or advise on offers of equity or debt securities will 
require a Capital Market Services License. 
  
The MAS views that crowdfunding could provide an alternative source of financing 
for start-ups and SMEs and it has eased the entry requirements for securities-based 
crowdfunding (SCF).  In June 2016, MAS (2016) reduced the base capital 
requirement from S$250,000 to S$50,000, and minimum operational risk 
requirement from S$100,000 to $50,000, as well as removed the requirement for a 
$100,000 security deposit.  MAS also simplified the pre-qualification checks for 
small offers to investors, including retail investors.  Crowdfunders need to determine 
that investors have either the financial competence or are suited to invest in SCF 
given their investment objectives and risk tolerance.  Previously, the requirement 
was that they needed to satisfy both conditions. As a safeguard for investors, MAS 
requires crowdfunders to document and disclose the key risks of the investments 
and obtain investors’ acknowledgement that they have read and understood these 
risks. In 2018, MAS issued new guidelines which require crowdfunders to enhance 
their practices and controls in relation to due diligence conducted on issuers, 
management of defaults, cessation of business and disclosures to investors. In 
particular, they are required to disclose interest rates and non-performing loan rates 
in a consistent manner. 
  
Second, lending to individuals via crowdfunding platforms would be viewed as 
moneylending in Singapore. Any person engaged in the business of moneylending, 
be it as a principal or as an agent, is required to hold a moneylender’s license from 
Singapore’s Registrar of Moneylenders under the Ministry of Law. However, they 
are exempted from licensing if the lending goes exclusively to business entities or 
accredited investors. As such, only platforms that allow lending to non-accredited 
natural persons, i.e. a very narrow form of P2P-lending, need a license. The 
licensing requirements under the Moneylenders’ Act are focused on protecting 
borrowers from predatory lending practices26. Moreover, the Moneylenders Act 
comes under the purview of the Ministry of Law, while the SFA is administered by 
                                                     
26   Such a license requires a deposit of SG$20,000 and a qualified and experienced person who is responsible for 
managing the moneylending business.  A relevant exception applies, however, if the lending goes exclusively to 
business entities or accredited investors. This lending is then executed by “excluded moneylenders”. 
 
  24 
SMU Classification: Restricted 
the MAS.  These differences could give rise to opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage27. So far, none of the 19 crowdfunders, except Minterest that are CMS 
licensees, have registered as moneylenders.  It is important that the authorities 
monitor the industry closely for regulatory arbitrage. Improving transparency and 
availability of data for this sector is critical for market discipline to work. In Dec 2018, 
Min Law lifted its moratorium on issuance of new licences. It issued six new 
monelylending licences to businesses that are able to make better credit 
assessments using AI and non-traditional data sources to assess credit worthiness, 
thus lowering credit cost.  
The rapid rise of fintech is expected to raise policy issues beyond the scope of 
prudential supervision such as safeguarding data privacy, cyber-security, consumer 
protection, fostering competition and compliance with anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism AML/CFT.  Regulation will have to adapt to the 
rapidly evolving financial landscape. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In Singapore, crowdfunding volumes have grown rapidly to make the country a top 
crowdfunding hub in Southeast Asia.  Our empirical results showed that the key 
drivers of crowdfunding for Singapore are its high GDP per capita, developed 
financial market and greater availability of venture capital.  We found evidence 
that crowdfunding has helped to improve SMEs’ cashflow.  This is consistent with 
the finding from our crowdfunder survey that SMEs have benefited from 
crowdfunding financing as they not only improved their cashflow but also induced 
financing from banks. 
 
We suggested that a combination of the Better Bank and Distributed Bank scenarios 
is likely to happen in Singapore.  Regulatory changes such as the issuance of new 
digital bank licences could shape the future fintech landscape. Regulators have to 
strike the right balance between developing the fintech industry while safeguarding 
financial stability.   While the systemic risk from crowdfunding is low currently given 
its small size and limited interconnections, this could change quickly over time and 
                                                     
27  For example, a sole proprietor may borrow in his/her own name instead of in the name of his/her business. 
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it is important for regulators to monitor the industry closely and require greater 
disclosure from the crowdfunders.  
 
As new digital technologies emerge that make the provision of financial services 
more efficient, they hold the potential to address barriers that SMEs face in 
accessing credit. We hope our findings in the paper will inspire more research on 
crowdfunders’ effect on SMEs, and both their roles in building a dynamic and 
inclusive society in Singapore. 
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Appendix 1: Case Studies of Crowdfunders 
Note: Please do not distribute the case studies, because we have not cleared the 
content with both the companies yet. Thank you for your understanding 
1) Case Study of Funding Societies  
Funding Societies was founded in 2015 by two former Harvard Business School 
students, Mr. Reynold Wijaya and Mr. Kelvin Teo. It operates in Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and it has received funding from SoftBank Ventures Asia 
amongst other investors.  
According to Mr. Teo, "We launched our Indonesia business in January 2016, six 
months after the launch in Singapore. The choice of Indonesia is primarily driven by 
our understanding and passion for the market (Reynold is Indonesian, while I have 
worked there for a year). Its large market size and our realistic chance of becoming 
No. 1 there are other driving factors. We are fortunate to have an excellent local 
country head to drive the business.” 
He added, “SME digital financing is a low margin, high volume business, and 
Singapore in itself is simply insufficient to build a sustainable business.”  
Currently, Funding Societies has more than 200 employees and financed over 
100,000 business loans, totalling over S$600 million in funds. The company serves 
mainly SMEs who need small, short-term and unsecured (uncollateralized) loans, 
and the average loan size is S$500,000. Its top lending segment is in the 
Information and Communication sector (32%), followed by the Commerce and 
Wholesales sector (21%), as well as the Hospitality and Food and Beverages 
sectors (16%). Interest rates vary from 9 per cent for secured loans, to as high as 
16 per cent for unsecured loans. In 2018, its weighted average returns to investors 
was 9.32%.  
Funding Societies’ default rates in 2018 are 1.5%, down from 2% to 3% two years 
ago, due to improvements in its underwriting model. Its proprietary credit-scoring 
model uses risk-based pricing, with some degree of automation, to price the loans, 
which significantly reduces the average time to process a loan. It is the first 
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crowdfunder in Singapore to integrate its system with MyInfo28 for a quicker and 
more accurate access to its borrowers’ business information. In addition, the model 
incorporates alternative data to help in their credit assessment, such as CEO’s 
credit card payment history and other qualitative information.  
Funding projects are loaded on the platform, after the borrowers have accepted a 
set of terms and conditions relating to quantum, tenor and interest rate. Lenders 
such as retail, institutional and accredited investors can invest in Funding Societies’ 
projects from as low as S$20 per project. Its financial services range from auto-
invest, to quick loan, to invoice financing and unsecured business loan up to 
S$1,500,000. For instance, auto-invest is an automated algorithm-driven 
investment model that matches investors on the platform according to their desired 
investment criteria. With quick-loan, the SME can get a loan from US$500 to 
US$40,000 within two business hours to approve and disburse. For larger loan 
quantum, it would require a waiting period of two to seven days.  
Funding Society shared a case of a client Mr. Prasad Raja who was the owner of 
Home Raj Pte Ltd, a Food and Beverage F&B Indian restaurant chain with a ten-
year history in Singapore. Mr. Raja needed some funds to set up a new shop in 
Changi Business Park and renovate an existing restaurant. However, his loan 
applications to the banks were rejected, due to several factors. One was because 
of his age, and the other was because his company was facing declining profit 
margins at his existing restaurant due to 50% decline in footfall from on-going 
roadworks that would last three years. Mr. Prasad was introduced to the concept of 
alternative financing and eventually secured funds from Funding Societies. Since 
then, he has opened two more outlets in the vicinity of Changi Business Park and 
Buona Vista in Singapore.  
 
According to Mr. Raja, “In this business, cashflow is king. You need cash flow. 
Getting the finances on time was a big help”.  
 
 
                                                     
28   Designed by the Government, MyInfo is a service that enables citizens and residents to manage the use of their 
personal data for simpler online transactions. Users control and consent to the sharing of their data and can view a 
record of past usage. 
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2) Case Study of Validus  
Validus was founded in 2015 by three co-founders Mr. Ajit Raikar, Mr. Vikas Nahata 
and Mr. Nikhilesh Goel. It has grown from a firm of 4 to 50 people in 2019. Amongst 
its investors are Temasek Holdings’ Vertex Ventures (Singapore sovereign wealth 
fund) and Dutch Investment Bank, FMO (a Netherland’s entrepreneurial 
development bank).  
Validus matches accredited individual and institutional investors (retail investors are 
excluded) to growing SMEs, with a total amount funded of S$270 million. It earns a 
fee of 0.75% to 3% on the amount crowdfunded.  
Currently, 75% of Validus’ loan portfolio is in invoice financing (with loan duration 
between one to three months) and the remaining 25% is in purchase order and 
working capital loans (with loan duration between 3 to 12 months). To diversity risk 
for its investors, Validus spreads the loans across several SMEs, which in turn 
allows Validus to price their loans at competitive rates, charging 4% to 6% on an 
annualized basis. The rates are similar to what banks offer to the SMEs. It is able 
to charge bank-like rates largely due to its institutional lenders which include family 
offices and sovereign wealth funds.  
Validus’ default rates are at 2.5%, which is lower than the NPL for SMEs of 5.1% in 
H1 201829. Its default rates are 0% for loans for medium sized vendors of its 
corporate partners. Several factors may have contributed to the low default rates. 
One, its use of fraud detection algorithm based on Benford’s Law have helped to 
detect irregularity in data if financial statements are doctored. Two, its business 
approach to collaborate with large stable corporates in Singapore has enabled it to 
reach out to vendors that have successfully secured contracts with the large 
corporates. For example, once a vendor has secured a contract, Validus offers 
short-term, low quantum loans at competitive interest rates. The vendor, a security 
services firm had won a $3 million project and required a 10% financing upfront (or 
S$300,000) to hire more security guards. Validus provided these financing over a 
short period, which helps ensure the project was completed.  
                                                     
29  MAS Financial Stability Report 2018, page 72. 
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To further expand its business, Validus is collaborating with Visa to offer virtual 
credit card services for SMEs to make payments to their suppliers. Validus is also 
working with another non-bank financial institution to test out the loan application 
process for F&B firms using its proprietary platform. Validus has plans to partner 
with banks in Singapore to use its proprietary platform to lend directly to SMEs. 
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Appendix 2: Glossary of Variables and Data Sources 
 
Crowdfunding Credit:  the amount of crowdfunding raised in U.S. dollars, based 
on the data collected from the ‘Global Alternative Finance Benchmarking Survey’. 
It comprises marketplace/P2P consumer lending, marketplace/P2P business 
lending, marketplace/P2P property lending, balance sheet business lending, 
revenue sharing/profit sharing crowdfunding, real estate crowdfunding, equity-
based crowdfunding, invoice trading, reward-based crowdfunding, donation-based 
crowdfunding, debt-based securities and balance sheet consumer lending. 
 
Source: Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance  
 
Population: country population data used to derive crowdfunding per capita. 
 
Source: World Bank data from CEIC  
 
WB Ease of Doing Business Index: The index ranks economies from 1 to 190, 
with first place being the best.  On a scale of 0 to 100, a higher value (a low 
numerical rank) means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business 
operations. The index averages the country's percentile rankings on 10 topics 
covered in the World Bank's Doing Business Survey; they are 1. Starting a business; 
2. Dealing with construction permits; 3. Paying taxes; 4. Trading across borders; 5. 
Registering property; 6. Getting electricity; 7. Enforcing contracts; 8. Protecting 
minority investors; 9. Getting Credit; 10. Resolving insolvency. The ranking on each 
topic is the simple average of the percentile rankings on its component indicators.   
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). 
ICRG composite risk rating: This is a composite risk indicator that summarises 
risks across three subcategories and their respective weights: political (50%), 
financial (25%), and economic (25%).  The political indicators are derived from 
surveys of risk perceptions related to each of the following 12 variables: 
government stability; internal conflict; external conflict; military in politics; law and 
order; ethnic tensions; bureaucracy quality; socioeconomic conditions; investment 
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profile; corruption; religious tensions; and democratic accountability. The financial 
risk rating are derived from the assessment of a country’s ability to pay its official, 
commercial and trade debt obligations and based on the following 5 variables: 
foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of 
exports of goods and services, current account as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services, net international liquidity as months of import cover and exchange 
rate stability. The economic risk components are derived from the assessment of a 
country’s current economic strengths and weaknesses related to each of the 5 
variables: GDP per Head, real GDP growth, annual inflation rate, budget balance 
as a percentage of GDP and current account as a percentage of GDP. The 
composite scores range from 0 to 100with higher values signifying less risk.    
Source: World Bank WDI database archive and the PRS Group. 
 
Availability of Venture Capital: this is a sub-index from the World Competitiveness 
Index of the World Economic Forum (WEF).   This is based on a survey response 
to the question: “In your country, how easy is it for start-up entrepreneurs with 
innovative but risky projects to obtain equity funding?  Its values lie between 
1=extremely difficult, 7= extremely easy) 
Source: World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey.  
Financial Institutions Depth and Financial Institutions Access: they are two 
of the six sub-indices from the IMF’s Financial Development Index.  The FD index 
is a relative ranking of countries on the depth, access and efficiency of their 
financial institutions and financial markets.   
 
The Financial Institutions Depth index includes the following indicators: 
 bank credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP; the assets of the mutual 
fund and pension fund industries and the size of life and non-life insurance 
premiums. 
 
The Financial institutions Access is proxied by the number of bank branches 
and ATMs per 100,000 adults, number of bank accounts per 1,000 adults, percent 
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of firms with line of credit, and usage of mobile phones to send and receive 
money. 
 
Source: http://data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C-43B1-AC26-
493C5B1CD33B&sId=1480712464593 
 
 
 
(1) Regression: Days Turned Cash 
Days Turned Cash (DTC): it measures the timeliness of SMEs paying their debt -- 
the percentage of debts paid on or before due date.  The lower the number, the 
timelier their payment. It is collected from payment records of more than 120,000 
companies in Singapore, across eight major sectors in the economy (retail, 
wholesale, construction, hospitality / food and beverage, information and 
communications, manufacturing, services, and transport / storage), in each quarter.    
 
Source: Experian previously DP Information Group 
 
Access to Financing Expectations: this is a sub-index from the SME Index 
compiled by the Singapore Business Federation (SBF) and Experian.  The SME 
Survey collects input from 3,600 SMEs on their expectations in seven key areas 
– Turnover, Profitability, Business Expansion, Capital Investment, Hiring, Capacity 
Utilisation, and Access to Financing.   A higher number means better access to 
financing expectations. 
Source: Experian previously DP Information Group 
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Appendix 3: Crowdfunders in Singapore 
Name/ Total 
Loan Book 
Size* 
Type of Investors 
and Minimum 
Investment 
Amount 
Duration and Loan 
Size 
Borrower Fees Weighted 
average  
returns to 
Investors*** 
Non-
performing 
loan 
rate*** 
Funding 
Societies; 
S$628.88m** 
 
 
 
Anyone.  
 
S$20 per project 
(initial deposit 
S$1,000). 
Invoice financing; 
3-12 months, up to 
80% of invoice 
value. 
 
Secured business 
loan; 3-12 months, 
up to S$3,000,000. 
 
Unsecured 
business loan; 3-
12 months, up to 
S$1,500,000. 
 
FS Bolt; quick 
loans of  up to 
S$50,000, 
approval within 2 
hours. 
2%-5% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
Weighted 
average 
9.32% p.a. 
(2018) 
1.81% 
(2018)  
 
SeedIn 
Technology; 
S$166 mn 
(excluding 
China) 
Anyone. 
 
S$1,000 per 
project. 
Unsecured or 
secured business 
loan against 
invoices/collateral; 
1-12 months, 
S$1,000-
S$5,000,000 
3%-5% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
Weighted 
average 
8.33% p.a. 
(2018) 
0% 
 
Validus; 
S$230.24 m 
Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
 
Minimum 
investment of 
1000 per faculty 
(via Auto Invest) 
Minimum portfolio 
size of S$50,000). 
Purchase order 
financing; 1-3 
months, up to 60% 
of purchase order 
value. 
 
Invoice financing; 
1-4 months, up to 
80% of invoice 
amount. 
 
Unsecured 
business loan; 3-
12 months, up to 
S$250,000. 
0.75%-3% per 
month. 
4.42-24% 
p.a. (2018) 
2.5% 
(2018) 
Capital Match; 
S$143.86 m  
Anyone. 
 
S$1,000 per 
project. 
Invoice financing; 1 
week-4 months, 
S$5,000-
S$2,000,000 or up 
to 85% of invoice 
value.  
 
15%-20% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
 
15-20% 
p.a. (2018) 
 
0.2%  
(2018) 
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Business loan; 3-
12 months, 
S$50,000-
S$200,000. 
Moolahsense; 
S$74.38 m 
(Feb 2019) 
 
Anyone. 
 
S$100 per project. 
 
Invoice financing; 
15-90 days, from 
S$15,000 up to 
80% of invoice 
value. 
 
Unsecured 
business loan; 3-
24 months, 
S$50,000-
S$5,000,000 
under Small Offers 
Exemption and 
above 
S$5,000,000 
under Private 
Placement 
Exemption. 
 
Secured business 
loan; 6-24 months, 
S$50,000-
S$5,000,000 
under Small Offers 
Exemption and 
above 
S$5,000,000 
under Private 
Placement 
Exemption. 
 
Invoice financing; 
1% per month 
and S$1,000 for 
annual 
application fees. 
 
Business loan; 
3%-5% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded and 
S$500-S$750 for 
annual 
application fees. 
 
9.9% 
p.a.(2018) 
14.82% 
Co-Assets; 
S$60 m 
Anyone. 
 
S$1,000 per 
project. 
Business loan; 
S$100,000-
S$5,000,000 
3%-5% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
9.9% p.a. 
(2018) 
0% 
Minterest; 
S$35 m 
Anyone. 
S$500 per project 
(initial 
deposit  S$1,000). 
Invoice financing 
and business loan; 
up to 12 months, 
minimum 
S$50,000. 
Invoice financing; 
minimum 0.5% 
per month. 
 
Business loan; 
minimum 2% on 
the amount 
crowdfunded. 
12.95% 
p.a. 
(2018) 
0.59%. 
FundTier; 
S$9.7 m 
Anyone. 
 
S$1,000 per 
project (initial 
deposit of 
S$50,000) 
Business loan; 
average deal size 
S$31,000 
na Weighted 
average: 
9.18% p.a. 
(2018) 
6.55% (as 
at Dec 
2018) 
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Aces 
Crowdfund 
Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
Business loan; 12-
24 months. 
 
Equity investment; 
typically longer 
duration. 
na na na 
Arcor Capital Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
Targeting start-ups 
who needs early 
stage financing or 
mid-market SMEs, 
financing though 
mezzanine or 
private equity 
strucure 
na na na 
Crowd Genie Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
 
S$1,000 per 
project. 
Unsecured 
business loan; 
S$50,000-
S$500,000 
2%-5% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
8.2% p.a. 
(2018) 
na 
Crowdo Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
 
Invoice financing; 
 
Business loan; 3-9 
months, backed by 
gold or jewellery 
collaters. 
 
Equity investment; 
na 5% p.a. 
(2018) 
0% 
Fund 
Singapore 
Anyone. 
 
S$1,000 per 
project. 
Business loan and 
equity investment; 
real estate, 
average deal size 
S$1,500,000 
na na na 
SmartFunding Anyone. 
 
S$100 per project 
(Initial deposit of 
S$1,000). 
Invoice financing; 
 
Business loan; 
 na na 
Fundnel; 
S$800 mn 
Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
Allows investors to 
invest in a set of 
start-ups, early to 
late stage, via 
equity convertible 
bonds, revenue 
sharing or 
bond/debt 
structure. 
S$1,000,000-
S$100,000,000, 
average deal size 
S$3,200,000 
5% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
 
na 
na 
  39 
SMU Classification: Restricted 
Capbridge; 
S$900 m 
(2018) 
 
Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
Business loan and 
equity investment 
in mid-to-late stage 
growth companies; 
S$5,000,000-
S$50,000,000 
na na na 
FundedHere; 
>S$100 mn 
Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
 
S$50,000 per 
Listco bond 
project. 
 
S$5,000 per 
equity project. 
 
Singapore-listed 
corporate bonds 
(Listco bonds) ;  24 
months, 
S$1,000,000-
S$5,000,000 
 
Equity investment 
in early stage start-
ups; S$100,000-
S$1,000,000 
Listco bonds; 
1.5% on the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
 
Equity; 6% (in 
cash) and 2% (in 
equity) of the 
amount 
crowdfunded. 
12.14% 
p.a.(2018) 
na 
InvestaCrowd; 
S$ 1bn 
Only accredited 
and institutional 
investors. 
 
S$100,000 per 
project (S$25,000 
for first-time 
investor). 
Real estate 
crowdfunder using 
blockchain 
technology 
 
Debt real estate 
investment (senior 
debt); 3-12 months 
 
Debt real estate 
investment (junior 
debt); 12-18 
months 
 
Preferred equity 
real estate 
investment; 18-36 
months 
 
Common equity 
real estate 
investment; >36 
months 
 
Note: all projects 
are securities-
backed with 
borrowers’ 
pledged assets 
 
Senior 
debt; 8%-
12% p.a. 
 
Junior debt; 
12%-18% 
p.a. 
 
Preferred 
equity; 
>20% 
p.a. 
 
Common 
equity; 
>40% 
p.a. 
 
Note: Most platforms engage escrow agencies such as Vistra and Watiga to hold investor funds.  
 
*Information is correct as at May 2019.**Total loan book size includes funds raised across all 
geographical regions that the crowdfunder operates (e.g. Funding Societies. 
 
***Since Mar 2019, the MAS requires holders of CMS license to publish the following statistics 
amongst other disclosure requirements. 
 
Weighted Average (Per Annum): Weighted Average Rate of Return is the percentage of the sum 
of all interests (per annum) less fees and charges for all loans (excluding interest payments for 
defaulted loans) divided by the total amount of loans disbursed during the year. This exclude the 
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amounts disbursed for defaulted loans during the applicable year. 
 
Non-Performing Loan Rate is computed as the ratio of loans (principal + interest) that are at least 
30 days past due over the total outstanding loans facilitated on the platform during the year 
(including outstanding amounts of defaulted loans) as at the applicable year end. 
 
Appendix 4: Alternative Models with World Bank Ease of Doing Business 
Index and ICRG Composite Risk Rating. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES DB Index ICRG 
   
GDP per Capita 40.84** 27.11** 
 (19.12) (11.47) 
Square of GDP per Capita -2.246** -1.579*** 
 (0.913) (0.540) 
Availability of Venture Capital 9.166*** 9.661*** 
 (1.026) (1.105) 
Ease of Doing Business Index 6.754  
 (6.750)  
ICRG Composite Risk Rating  10.04 
  (9.832) 
Financial Institutions Access 
 
Financial Institutions Depth 
-18.62*** 
(7.173) 
22.23*** 
-7.521** 
(3.608) 
18.47*** 
 (5.377) (4.607) 
AUS 16.66*** 8.903** 
 (5.622) (3.582) 
IND 15.31 9.409 
 (10.15) (5.724) 
IDN 36.93*** 25.67*** 
 (11.07) (6.858) 
JPN 16.06** 6.730* 
 (6.683) (3.834) 
KOR 11.46** 5.410 
 (5.110) (3.485) 
MYS -11.66** -10.82** 
 (5.365) (4.243) 
GBR 12.09** 5.529 
 (5.420) (3.839) 
USA 19.60*** 10.57*** 
 (6.189) (3.757) 
Constant -234.8** -169.6** 
 (112.6) (76.07) 
Observations 41 45 
R-squared 0.945 0.936 
Number of Countries 9 9 
Robust Yes Yes 
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RMSE 0.888 0.978 
Dependent Variable Crowdfunding per Capita 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
-  
- End of Paper   - 
